BATNAs in Negotiation: Common Errors and Three Kinds of 'No
In: Negotiation Journal, April 2017 Forthcoming
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In: Negotiation Journal, April 2017 Forthcoming
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In: Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper No. 14-061
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In: Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper No. 14-091
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In: Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper No. 13-004
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In: International organization, Band 46, Heft 1, S. Special Issue: Knowledge, power, and international policy coordination, S. 323-365
ISSN: 0020-8183
World Affairs Online
In: International organization, Band 46, Heft 1, S. 323-365
ISSN: 1531-5088
Analyses of international policy cooperation are often marked by analytic and empirical confusion. First, by largely treating cooperation as a binary phenomenon (typically, as cooperation versus defection), they direct attention away from crucial issues of distribution, the possibility of suboptimal cooperation, and the degree of unrealized joint gains. Second, even when simple matrix games with known payoffs capture distributional conflict and Pareto-inferiority, they typically do so by suppressing the inherent uncertainty and the need to learn, especially with respect to payoffs and values. And, third, even when they take both power and knowledge-dependent joint gains into account, they often treat the two as competing alternatives or as analytically separable, rather than as inherently bound together in the bargaining process. This article describes the emerging negotiation-analytic approach and argues that it provides a useful framework within which these conceptual problems can be avoided and explanatory power can be enhanced. From a negotiation-analytic perspective, it argues, epistemic communities can be viewed as distinctive de facto natural coalitions of "believers" whose main interest lies not in meeting material objectives but, rather, in expanding to become winning coalitions capable of ensuring the adoption of specific policy projects. An epistemic community's actions can thus be understood as changing the perceived zone of possible agreement through well-understood ways that are favorable to its objectives. Although ultimately a community's influence is exercised through bargaining, there is practically no theory of bargaining elaborated in the epistemic communities approach. Despite this and other drawbacks, the approach helps account for players' interests and usefully insists on the importance of perceptions and learning in negotiation. The article concludes that the effects of shared beliefs and of policy conflict can be readily incorporated into the negotiation-analytic model of bargaining, thereby giving rise to more precisely drawn observations about the conditions under which "believers" will have the strongest impact on negotiated outcomes. This will in turn make it possible to improve policy prescriptions in the actual or potential presence of epistemic communities.
In: International security, Band 15, Heft 4, S. 110-148
ISSN: 0162-2889
World Affairs Online
In: International security, Band 15, S. 110-148
ISSN: 0162-2889
With reference to past negotiations over the Law of the Sea and the Montreal Protocol on Chlorofluorocarbons.
In: International Security, Band 15, Heft 4, S. 110
In: International organization, Band 37, Heft 2, S. 281-316
ISSN: 0020-8183
World Affairs Online
In: International organization, Band 37, Heft 2, S. 281-316
ISSN: 1531-5088
Students of international negotiations often examine strategic interactions among a given set of parties dealing with a specified group of issues. The issues and parties themselves are often choice variables whose ultimate configuration can have decisive effects on a bargain's outcome. Using a variety of international cases, I investigate the properties of several classes of moves that are intended to alter the issues and parties of an original negotiation. A unified approach to the analysis of such situations suggests numerous distinct means by which the "addition" or "subtraction" of issues can yield one-sided gains to the use of power; can yield joint gains that create or enhance a zone of possible agreement; and can reduce or destroy a zone of possible agreement. The effects of adding or subtracting parties are similarly analyzed. However, unintended complexity, unforeseen interrelationships, organizational considerations, transactions costs, and informational requirements may alter the analysis of such moves.
In: Journal of policy analysis and management: the journal of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 77
ISSN: 1520-6688
In: Journal of policy analysis and management: the journal of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 77-95
ISSN: 0276-8739
Occasionally, the work of experts on analytic models is brought into use in complex policy negotiation. Such use is illustrated through review of: the Massachusetts Instit of Technology Model of ocean mining & its use at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea; various models used in negotiations of the UN Conference on Trade & Development; the 1969 negotiations between New York City & the firefighters' union; & negotiations that took place in 1974 in the Tyrolean village of Obergurgl, Austria, related to ecological problems. In all these cases, the models were valuable in helping one or both sides to learn more about the subject under negotiation, & in identifying disputants' interests more explicitly. For a model to have such benefits, however, it must be seen as independent & as justified by superior knowledge. W. H. Stoddard.
In: Harvard PON Working Paper
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In: Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper No. 15-053
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